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INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND
BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS
Louis B. Sohn
I feel fortunate that I have this
opportuniLy to talk about human righLs
and international law, because too often
people think of international law as
being purely a law beLween sLates. We
feel concerned about what the major
states are going to do to each other, and
we forget that behind them there are
thrre biIlion individuals, alJ of them
worried about their rights and duties.
What [ wish to give you today is a view
of international law from below, where
human beings are asking for help, rather
than from above, from the 10fLy world
of states. This is an area of internaLional
law in which, over the years, we developed perhaps more law than in other
areas. If you look at the jurisprudence
of international tribunals, you discover
that more eases deal wiLh prohlems of
human righLs than with rights and duties
of states themselves.

There is also another misconception:
namely, thaL this is a new area of law;
that realJy this branch of inLernaLional
law developed in the 19Lh cell LUry as
part of Llw cenLllry of imperialism; LhaL
Lhis is the parL of international law
which the big powers imposed on the
smalJer ones, espeeialJy on the LaLin
Americans, and which the West imposed
on the other parts of the world.
[f YOll look aL history, YOIl wry ~oon
discover that this is a misleading theory.
International law in this area can be
Lraced very far back to problems between ciLy-states of Italy, between the
l\loorish kings and the Christian kings in
Spain, then between the other powers
of WesLern Europe: England and
France, England and the Netherlands,
and hetween France and Spain. For
somc reason, many of the cases of LhaL
period seem Lo involve the Portuguese.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Protection of Citizens Abroad. One
of our first cases-quite well known-is
the Bernard Dongrasilli case in 1295 in
which King Edward the First of England
gave Mr. Dongrasilli permission to engage in privateering against Portugal in
order to recover the value of plundered
ships that the Portuguese had taken.!
And, already in 1295, in the documents
relating to this case, you find all the
basic ingredients of the rules of protection of individual rights in international
law. First, that it is a right, in fact a
duty, of a state to protect its subjects.
Much later this principle was, in a way,
codified by the eminent Swiss jurist
Valtel who, in 1758, wrote that
Whoever ill treats a citizen indirectly injures the state, which
must protect that citizen. The
sovereign of the injured citizen
must avenge the deed and, if
possible, force the aggressor to
give full satisfaction or punish
him, since otherwise the citizen
will not obtain 'the chief end of
civil society, ,~hich is protection.
Thus Vattel codified what was already
practiced for the previous 500 years.
The other factor which the English
practice recognized in 1295 was that
both the foreign state and all of its
subjects were responsible for what the
state or its citizens had done. The
procedure to recover damage was then
as follows. The victim should try to
obtain a remedy in the local courts;
secondly, thrre should he diplomatic
negotiations; and only if these should
fail, would more forceful means be
permissible. And then comes the basic
rule, which, again goes all the way hack
to the 13th century; and if one should
search the Italian jurisprudence, one can
find it evcn in thc lIth century. That
rule is that if justice i~ denied, a state
ca.n authori1.c enforcenH'nt action, and
the action that was authorized in those
days, interestingly enough, was the use
of naval force.

The injured person was authorized to
equip a ship and go on the high seas and
find a ship of the other side and capture
it, hring it back to port, if possible, have
it sold properly, have the value ascertained and this value deducted from
what the other country was owing to
him for a denial of justice. This method
of issuing special letters of marque and
reprisal persisted up to at least tlH' 17th
century in that fashion, hut it later
became confused with general reprisals
ordered in wartime and with privateering which sometimes shaded into piracy.
All these three things are, howevC'r,
quite different. Whatl am talking about
is the limited right of reprisal in order to
obtain proper compensation for the
damage a person has suffered. From the
very beginning this was a right exercised
by a state to protect its citizens against
another state, but exercised for a long
time through the private self-help of the
individual, who was, however, properly
authorized to do it by the state.
In the 17th century, King Charlrs the
Seeond and, to some extent, Cromwell
before him, felt it might be safer to use
the public navy to obtain adequate
compensation. Of course, as a eompromise at the beginning, both methoels
were uscd. The injured citizen can go
out and try to e10 it himself, hut lit the
same time the government ean authorize:
the navy to do it as well, and when the
whole amount is collected, by whichever means, the procedure comes to an
end. There was, of course, a very elaborate system of accounting to ensure that
the one authorized to engage in reprisals
did not get too much. Some, nevertheless, engaged in private robbery on the
side, and over the years the danger of
abuse increased.
It was only later, in the 18th century, at the time of Vattcl whom I have
mentioned before, that the prot(~cti()n
of rights of individuals IwcalllCl IlIl1e~h
more clearly an activity between states,
and the governments began to use their
navies to obtain redress for their
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citizrns. Anrl it just happens that this is
ahout the time that the United States
came into existence and that for the
United States, practice mostly has been
in the second area, though you still find
in the 1830's treaties concluded by the
United States with other countries
l'aying that private reprisals, while normally prohihited, might he permissihlc
in some cases, in particular if the other
party -denies justice. So you still have
that old rule pcrsisting up to the 19th
century. And there was, in faet, one
case in which a person injured was
trying to get through Congress permission to obtain letters of marque and
reprisal in a case against a Latin American country-the Aves Island claim in
IB57. In that case our Government said
to the other country: if you fail to
comply with the rules, if you continue
to deny justice, we might issue the
letters of reprisal. Thus this practice
persisted beyond the middle of the 19th
century.
But the practice of the United States
was mostly of a different kind: to send
the Navy or the Marines to protect our
citizens; if necessary to occupy a customs station or a town in order to get
hack the property which was taken
away or to protect the lives of individuals. The authors disagree ahout the
number of such cases. Somc say that
there have been 140 cases, some list
only 70, others say that there were even
less than that, that there were 50 or so,
the other cases heing really cases of
puhlic action rather than action to
protect the individual. But in the 19th
century, and even this one up to the
1920's, there have certainly been many
cases in which military forces, in particular naval forces, have been used in
order to protect citizens.
To some extent this practice has
heen codified in the regulations for the
governml'nt of the Navy of thc United
States in ] C) W, and almost the samc
provision is still in the U.S. Navy Regulations 1948. These regulations prov1de

that on occasions ~vherc injury to the
United States or the citizens thereof is
committed or threatcned, in violation of
thc principles of international law or a
treaty, the senior officer present should
consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States and
should take such steps as the gravity of
the situation demands. The rcsponsibility for action takenby a naval force,
however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof. One easily can
see the difficult prohlem facing the
commanding officer. He has to decide
such a case on the spot; consult with the
diplomatic officer if possible, but otherwise he has to decide by himself that
action is required. In at least one case,
the Barrundia affair at the beginning of
the 20th century in Central America,
the commander of a U.S. war vessel was
rclieved of his command by the Navy
Department for action taken under the
advice of the American Minister in that
country, when this did not meet with
the approval of his own superior officer. 2 So a naval commander has to take
such action on his own risk very often;
though, of course, now that instant
communication with naval headquarters
is possible, that prohlem is less likely to
anse.
As a result of this practice, one
author has said that the American Navy
had been sent to every quarter of the
globe to protect life and property of
fellow citizens, and that American naval
officers were entrusted with this diplomatic task because the; could best unite
force with persum;ion.
Professor Buergenthal brought to my
attention an article hy Colby M. Chester, entitled "Diplomacy of the Quarter
Deck, ,04 which was defined as the "necessity to meet the questions of international law and rendcr decisions at once
without time for the mature consideration of diplomatic usage." Such diplomacy is (\xerciscd vcry of len on curt
orders from home governments of the
naval officer which are restricted to a
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brief mandate: "Protect American interests, we rely upon your judgment."s
As naval officers you can see the difficulties which you may face if this
approach should continue to be necessary. One cannot be surprised that there
is some reluctance to make the necessary judgments, that there is some
feeling that it might be dangerous to
permit such action, the costly mistakes
have sometimes been made, and that
some other way should be found for
dealing with the problem.
Throughout the 19th century, in a
parallel way, there developed another
system of protection of citizens abroad,
namely through diplomatic action. Professor Borchard from Yale wrote a book
about it in 1915. Later we turned this
problem around and gave it the name of
responsibility of states for injuries to
aliens. The number of precedents, the
number of both diplomatic cases and
decisions of arbitral tribunals is really
tremendous. When Professor Baxter and
I some time ago started working on this
question, we were able to prepare a
draft convention and a short commentary in a few years, hut when we
started trying to colleel all the international practice and put it in some
systematic fashion, we soon found out
that in our lifetime we would not have a
sufficient number of man-years to complete the task. Consequently, the commentary remains, rather disappointingly, only half completed, but still our
attempt has shown the tremendous
scope of the material existing in this
particular area.
The normal approach in case of an
international claim is to try to ohtain,
first, satisfaction by diplomatic means,
to persuade the other side to go to an
arbitral tribunal or to an international
court, and only as a last resort, perhaps,
was it permissible to use force. I think
the mit' probahly was stated Ilt'st,
though in a limited area, by onl' of the
Hague Conyt>ntions of 1907-the
Second Convention, or Porter ·Conven-

tion (so-named after Admiral Porter
who was instrumental in preparing it). It
prohibited the use of force for the
recovery of 'contract debts; but people
often forget that there is a second
paragraph to it stating that this prohibition does not apply if the other party
concerned refuses to go to arbitration or
makes the arbitration impossible or
after the award has been rendered re. fuses to execute it. Thus this convention
is very closely connected with arhitral
or judicial settlement of disputes and
applies only if the other party, in good
faith, participates in arhitration procedure. If it does not, then, in away,
the convention permits the use of force
to obtain the payment of a debt.
We have thus traced through some
700 years one of the ways by which
international law protects individuals,
but it must be remembered that this
method is limited to the protection by a
country of its own citizens who have
suffered an injury abroad.
Protection of Minorities. The next
area in which we started protecting
individuals was the area of minoritil·s.
And here, starting with some eases in
the Balkans in the second half of the
19th century and then extending
through very elaborate procedures
developed hy the League of Nations in
the interwar period, a special system
was established for protecting individuals belonging to minorities-racial,
national, or religious-especially in
countries of Eastern Europe and the
Middle East. In those eases; before the
League of Nations days, humanitarian
intervention was used. One has to note,
however, that there is an important
difference between humanitarian intervention in this sense and military intervention, sometimes also called humanitarian. which is used to pro teet a state's
I'itizmls abroad. I f you prol!'l:t your
own dtizens abroad, this is n·ally a case
simply of self-help, which could be used
in the past where other prorl'dures of
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international law like arbitration have
failed, and those rules are suhjecl to lhe
basic rulcs applicable lo the usc of foree
in international law, including lhe rules
which are now embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations.
Quite different from that is the true
procedure of humanitarian intervention
which was developed by the Concert of
Europe, originally, I suspect, only to
protect the minorities within the Olloman Empire; for example, the Lebanese
case around 1860. Even previously, the
principal European powers found it
necessary to protect the Belgians from
the Dutch, and to protect the Greeks
from the Turks. You remember when
the combined navies of Europe defeatcd
the Turkish Fleet at the Battle of
Lepanto in 1827. You might say this
was one case of collective naval intervention. There was also the naval blockade of the port of Anlwerp in 1832.
From this point on throughout the 19th
century there were ~everal l'ases in
which the powcrs of Europe authorized
military or naval action to protect various minorities. And some of the decisions, including those relating to three
eascs just mentioned, were execu ted
through collective action of the Concert
of Europe. I t was not simply done by an
action of a particular state nor was any
state entitled to takc steps on behalf of
the Concert of Europe without proper
prior authorization.
One of the reasons given for developing the League of Nations into an
international institution for the protection of minorities was to avoid humanitarian intervention by individual states.
Intervention as such was somctimes
done purely for humanitarian reasons,
sometimes for hidden political reasons,
and sometimes resulted in an occupation of vast territories, in which thcre
was no withdrawal wlwn thc problem
was solved. The I.,·aguc·thert·fort· ar~ul'd
that it is necessary to take it out of the
hands of the individual states and put it
into international hands.

Protection of ·Peoples' in Colonial
Territories. Another strand ill this paltl~rn of intcrnational COIIl!Crn for the
rights of individuals emerged in the area
of protection of colonial peoples. Beginning in the second half of the 19th
century-though one could go to the
Congress of Vienna in 1815 as far as
cprtain acts such as those relating to
slavery in Africa were concerned -there
lUIS been a conseiolls effort to protecl
the colonial peoples from l:xcl'ssive
abuse by the Western Powers. Some
self-restrictive agreements were adopted
for just this purpose. Under the League
of Nations they were broadened and put
u'nder clearer international supervision
in the so-called mandates system. This
was later taken over by the United
Nations and transformed into a trusteeship system. And, as you know, the
United States is a trustee for territories
in the Pacific that originally belonged to
Germany and then were put under a
Japanese mandate. Over the years a
mantle of protection was devcloped and
now includes an international commission to supervise the mandates called
the Trusteeship Council. J t supervises
the few remaining areas undl~r tl"U~tce
ship. carefully reviews reports submiLLed
by lhe administering authority, hears
petitions, and even f;ends investigative
commiLLl!es to ensure thal thl! situations
described in the report are as reported.
So we have at least three basic
strands which can be traced to the
period before 1945-diplomatic protection which, in a way, developed from
tire oldt·r private rcpri~al~ idea and
which, in turn, merged into the concept
of the responsibility of states for injuries to aliens; secondly, we have minorilies protection, whieh was originally
connected with humanitarian intervention; and thirdly, we have the trusteeship sY8telll which succecdt'd tlH~ mandates system.
Protection of Human Rights by the
United Nations. When the Charter of
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the United Nations was drafted in 1945,
the framers had to take all these previous developments into account. There
was also the additional fact that human
rights .were violated on a gross scale,
especially by the Nazis, just before and
during the Second World War. As you
know, millions of people, not only Jews
but also people of various Eastern European nationalities, had been massacred.
That is why there existed in San Francisco a feeling that it was possiblc to go
much further in the protection of
human rights in the new chartcr than we
went in the Covenant of the League of
Nations. In consequence, provisions requiring the United Nations to promote
the protection and the observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms
are scattered throughout the charter,
and a special commission was established on the subject-the Commission
on Human Rights.
In fact, there was a strong pressure in
San Francisco to put a bill of rights into
the charter itself, and thc. only excuse
for not doing it was lack of time. It had
been decided that the conference had to
end on a certain date, and whatever was
not drafted hy that date could not be
included in the charter. But a promise
was given that one of the first jobs of
the United Nations would he to produce
such a hill of rights of a universal scope.
It soon became obvious that to provide
a comprehensive international agreement or treaty or covenant on the
subject was going to take a long time.
People were impatient; they wanted to
draft something quickly. To satisfy this
demand, it was suggestcd that there be
adopted a {Iniversal Declaration of
Human Rights hy means of a resolution
of the General Assembly. This was
drafted relatively qui~kly and was
adopted in 1948. I t was a very broad
document, written in a rather general
fashion, but it listed in a clear :lIld
unambiguous ma/llll'r the human rights
which the Unitt'd Nations promised to
promote and protect. i\ t the time of its

adoption it was thought' that this resolution was purely declaratory in character
and, like other resolutions of the General Assembly, did not really create any
binding obligations. However, over the
years a doctrine was developed that the
Universal Declaration was really a binding document. In later documents of a
similar character-like the declaration
against colonialism and the declaration
on racial discrimination-it was said that
those new declarations and the old ones
were binding and that states were
obliged to apply them in good faith. So,
retroactively, in 1968 a United Nations
Conference on Human Rights met in
Teheran and decided that the Universal
Declaration was meant to be a binding
document from the very beginning. The
declaration was subject to various interpretations of speeifie provisions. The
provisions were vague and general, and,
as a result, it could be argued in each
particular case whether any provision of
the declaration was really applicable.
Nevertheless, important progrcss thus
was made in devcloping human rights
standards of a universal character.
But progress in this area did not stop
there. About 20 years or more were
spent working on two covenants on
human rights; one on economic and
cultural social rights, and the oth(~r on
civil and political rights. The purpose
was to be more precise, to define more
exactly the protection to which one is
entitled, in even more detailed fashion
than was done in the Constitution of
the United States. And perhaps for that
reason the documcnt might ht! less
perfect bccause the more detailed it
becomes, the greater is the Iikelihuod of
introducing some mistakes. If the document can be limited to more general
propositions, one can rely on thc courts
to find within the broad language of the
old provision any new details that may
he needed to meet varying circumstances.
The United Nations emharked on
this hig enterprise, and the covenants

593
were prcpared first hy the Commission
on Human Rights and then revised by
the Third Commillce of the Gencral
Assembly. Each body has gone over
them carefully, months at a time, and
finally in 1966 reaehed an agreement on
thesc very eomprehensivc general documents. It is not yet in force; it has been
ratified, interestingly, by two Latin
American states, Costa Rica and Ecuador-Costa Rica has always been a
pioncer in this area-and by three Meditcrranean states, Cyprus, Syria, and
Tunisia; but the big powers are conspicuous by their absence. The covenants need 35 ratifications before they
can come into effect, and it is going to
take some time before it happens. But
evcrybody feel.s that sooner or later the
United States and other big powers will
be faced by the fact that the covenants
are in force, and if they do not ratify
them, they will be considered, in a way,
pariahs of the world community.
The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provides for certain enforcement
machinery, though it is rather weak. It
providcs simply for a committee to
which each state is obliged to present
reports. Nevertheless, in some international organizations-such as the International Labor Organization where
some more than 100 conventions on
labor problems havc been ado(ltedthese reports provide a very good picturc of the existing situation and provide a basis for evaluating what might be
going on in a particular state, and for
trying to push them to do better in the
future. 1\10st states do not like to be
criticized ycar aftcr year, and under the
pressure of public opinion they mend
their ways as Soon as public discussion
of their reports shows conditions exist
that are not acceptable.
I n addition, the Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights provides that sllites
may agrc(~ that in ca~e of a disput(~
about an nllcgcd violation of thc covenant by one state, another state can file
a complaint, or they call it simply a

"comlllunication," with the eOlllllliLLce.
The committec can eithcr itself deal
with the mattcr or appoint a special
conciliation commiLlee to study the
case in detail, to find, if possible, an
amicable solution, and to prescnt a
report on the facts and possibilities of
settling the mattcr. Relying again on
pressurc of public opinion, it may he
hoped that thc state concerned will
ac(~ept the suggcstions of thc cOlll\llittre
l)(~forc its noncompliance is puhlicly
exposed. There is, finally, an additional
optional protocol which provides for
the right of individuals to approach th~
committee. This is necessary because
experience shows that states are very
reluctant-unless they have special political interests such as those of Austria
in the case of the Bolzano region of
Italy or those of Greece with respect to
Cyprus-to bring a case before an international body against another state. As
one State Department official once explained to me, either the state is
friendly and we do not want to jeopardize our friendship by submiLling a case
against it, or the state is unfriendly and
we do not want to cause further deterioration in our relations with it. So
whichever way you look at it, thcre is
always a good excuse not to take any
action. Therefore, it is fclt that unless
the individual cone(~rn(:d can eOlllplain
and take it out of the area of being a
dispute between states, you are not
going to get very far for a long time.
That such a procedure is possible is
proven by the European experience.
Protection of Human Rights in Europe and the Americas. TI\(~ Europ(!ans
first took a step of providing not only
for a European body, the Council of
Europe, composed of government delegates, but also for a European consultative assembly composed of members of
nalional parlianwnts. The assembly very
SOOIl started pushing lhe governments
by arguing that, as European states are
dedicated to human rights, they ought
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to have a convention spelling out those
rights in detail and providing machinery
for seeing to it that everybody follows
the rules. For a few years ·the big
countries and the governments in general were resisting the pressure, hut
even tually the parliamentarians caused
so much commotion in the council and
in the national parliaments that the
Council of Ministers had to agree on
something. On the basis of a draft
prepared largely hy the parliamentary
assembly itself, a European Convention
on Human Rights was written. Again, it
was said, that is nice, you have got a
convention, hut who is going to ratify
it? Slowly but surely, starting with the
small states, everybody ratified it except
France, which had Algeria as the excuse
at that time. Later, after the loss of this
excuse, France somehow forgot to
ratify the convention, though several
Frenchmen played a major role in its
preparation.
But apart from that, sevcral othcr
European countries wcnt even furthl'r.
The convention, in addition to defining
the rights, had an optional provision for
the right of individU<Jls to bring complaints. A{!;ain people said, which state is
going to be so crazy to agree to somcthing like this? Again, some small states
were the first, then Germany, and finally, 2 years ago, even the United
Kingdom agreed to do it. [taly is faced
by a similar decision, because until now
she has always had the excuse that she
could not do it as long as the British had
not ratified this optional clause. Now
that the British have accepted the right
of individuals to file complaints, Italy
has lost her excuse. But, still, Italy is
not alone, as six other European countries have not yet accepted this clause.
On the other hand, those that have done
so have discovered that, while they have
always applied the basic principles of
human rights, tht're have been a few
an~as of law in which they w('re rt'ally
not up to par. For instance, the British
discovered that their immigration pro-

cedures did not provide any proper
administrative revie,\ of the decisions of
the inspectors about admission of aliens
and their families. The Germans and the
Austrians found that soine of their
criminal law procedures did not comply
with the standards of the convention;
and similar weaknesses were found in
other countrics. Thus even in countrics
which have always been considered as
the leaders in the protection of human
rights, some shortcomings were discovered, and they were only corrected
when the people concerned were given
the right to petition the international
commission.
Many of the cases before the European Commission were dismissed on the
ground that there was a failure Lo
exhaust local remedies available in national courts or that there was really no
denial of justice hy a statc. SLiIl, l\
number of cases were decided by the
commission, and a few of them were
even sent to a European Court of
Human Rights. This court was alga only
optional, but, after a while, t'nough
stall's accepted it so a numhcr of cases
could be submitted to it, includin~ a
very important one about linguistic
problcms in Belgium. There were also
some eases relating to particular individuals, involving, for instance, the length
of detention in Germany and Austria
pending trial. The European Court
found in one case that the detention,
though prolonged, was justified, hut in
the other case, that the detention was
not justified.
So, what we now have is living proof
that such decisions are not only possible, hut are acceptable to the stutes.
Once the right of petition is accepted, it
works in practice pretty well, and there
is no reason really for a state to fear it.
In the Americas we have an InterAmerican Commission on Human
Rights with very limited jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, after a p(~riod of time it
was able to arrogate to itsdf certain
powers, and it proved to be useful in the
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Dominican Repuhlic. Now we are preparing a more elaborate convention on
human rights for the Amcricas and, in
addition, there are proposals for a commission and even a court.
Protection of Human Rights of Military Personnel. Provisions on human
rights am also contained in those parts
of international law which are of speciill
interest to the military. The Status of
Forces Agreements, ('speeially the
NATO Agreement ill article 7, paragraph 9, contain a small codification of
human righLs for the benefit of armed
forces auroad. The Hague and Geneva
Conventions on the laws of war, prison('rs of war, rights of civilians in
oecupi('d t('rritories, ('t ('ctera, ulso contain human righLs provisions. Some of
l\lI'm have been, of course, enforced lIy
national courts, hut tlll'm huve been also
international tribunals, especially at
Nun!mherg and Tokyo. The United Nations has prepared, though it is not yet
in force, a code of off('nses against the
peace and s('curity of mankind which
tries to codify tIll' Nurembt·rg and
Tokyo cxperience. Also, a special international criminal court has bcen propos('d, and a statute of it has been
draftcd by the United Nations.
Thus
can sec that in several arcas
of international law wc have had trt~
mendous developments since 1945. The
canard that individuals are not subjects
of international law no longer has any
basis. It is generally accepted that inclividuals now have clear rights under
international law and various n~medies
to secum their ohservilllee. On the oth/~r
hand, they arc responf'ible personally
for violations of international law, as
some Germans and Japanese discovered
after the war.

;ve

Human Rights in Southern Africa. I
hav!' tried to paint. up to this point, thl!
positiVI' developments. Of course, we
have also some skeletons in our closets
here, and mostly they are scaLlered

around southern Africa. First, we have
the violations of human rights in South
A friea itself that have persisted since
I <J4(,_ The problem is racial scgregation,
in particular apartheid, which now has
been det:lared hy tht~ General Assembly
to IJC a crime against humanity. At the
present time the United Nations is
working on the possibility of a proeedure that would deal with these alleged criminals, who praeLil~ed upartIwid, if they can be caught outside of
South Africa. .
Southern Rhodesia is involved in a
similar problem to some extent. However, it is complicated by thc fact that it
was a colonial territory which, theoretically. is still under the jurisdiction of
thl! Unitrd Kingdom. Tlll~ Unitcd Nations adopLs a re[-;olution every so oftcn
advising the United Kingdom that it
l'hould srnd a military force there to
restore democracy and tlw principle of
"one person, one vote" and to abolish
their constitution and impose a much
better one upon them. Here is a case in
whil'h the United Nntibns is encour%ring
Western imperinlism in a part of Africa
for the benefit of Africans.
The ncxt case is a cnse of South-Wcst
Africa. It was a mandate of South
Africa under the League, it was never
transformcd into a trustceship, and we
have had u dispute goin{! on with reaped
to it bctween the United Nations and
South Africa since 1945. What is the
status of South-West Africa, and can the
United Nations, as successor of the
Leugue, do anything ahout it? There
have bcen some opinions of the International Court of Justice thnt the United
Nations is the suecessor and is entitled
to supervision of the mandate in place
of the League.
We have also had a particular dispute
(you might call it a case of humanitarian
intervention), in which Ethiopia and
Lilwria brought a case before the International Court of Justice against South
Africa. This rase was dismisscd finally
by the Court after a checkered career on
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the ground that Liheria and Ethiopia
really had no right to complain to the
Court about how South Africa trcats
peopl(' in South-West Africa. The Court
held that if the two complaining states
could have shown that their own interests were; involved, that issue could
possibly have been brought before the
Court, but as presented, the case was
not within the Court's jurisdiction. This
decision naturally offended all the African countries very much, and they
claimed that this demonstrated thal this
was a Western-dominated Court, that it
is not going to protect African interests,
and that something else will have to be
done.
As a result the Afro-Asian group
pushed a resolution through the United
Nations terminating the mandate of
South Africa over South-West Africa,
appointing a special commission to take
charge of it and a commissioner to
administcr it, and ordered South Africa
to deliver the mandatc to them. South
Africa replied that this was all completely illegal and that she would not
comply with the resolution. The commission tried to get into South-West
Africa a few Limes buL was refused
entry. No attempt was made Lo Lry Lo
force the issue, or to visit in South-West
Africa without SouLh Africa's permission.
In view of this crisis, the General
Assembly has adopted many resolutions. The SecuriLy Council has also
adopted resoluLions criticizing South
Africa and has ordered members of the
United Nations to do something about
it. There is a very interesting provision
in one of the resolutions of the Security
Council calling upon all sLates to increase their moral and material assistance to the peopll' of Namibia (this is
the new name of South-West A frica) in
their struggle against foreign occupation. (Security COli neil rt'solution 2()'J
(L 9(9).) Some of the rt~solutions of the
General Assemhly against Southern
Rhodesia and Portugal are even more

explicit, as they ask all states to help the
rehels against the Governments of those
eountries.
The last area of Southern Africa with
which I will deal is the Portuguese
colonies. Portugal eontends that it does
not have any colonies, that the ar('as are
not subject to any supervision or the
United Nations because they are simply
African provinces of Portugal, and the
inhabitants of those colo nics have
exactly thc same rights as citizens of
Portugal. The United Nations claims
that they are colonies, that Portugal is
accountable to the United Nations, that
they are subject to the declaration
about anticolonialism which is supposedly binding on all members, and, as
a result, Portugal is violating the charter
by not providing self-determination for
these colonies.
To enforce its decision, the General
Asscmbly _has recommended economic
sanctions against these three countries
controlling southern Africa. However,
the only economic sanctions against.
that part of the world that have been
actually enacted are those against
Southern Rhodesia. There is a binding
d(~cision of (he Security Council on (he
Southern Rhodesian sanctions, and the
Government of the United States, by an
l~xeeutive order, has enact(·u those sanctions as hinding on all the citizens of tIll!
United SLates:
This is where the story ends for tlHl
momenL hut, of course, tlu:re still cxist
some very important problem areas.
How much further can we go in thc area
of human rights? h, it eurrl'ntly possih!t~
to provide for further enforcement of
human rights? Should there be developed the old concept of humanitarian intervention into a new concept
of intervcntion by the United Nations
or by a regional organization under the
aUl'pices of the United Nations in l'ases
wlwre ,this is required'? Tlu! isslu's involved here can be shown best in the
so-called second Congo case which is
mentioned in Professor Lillich's arLicle. 6
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I n this instance thl' United Stales provided transportation for Belgian paratroops going to Stanleyville in order to
resr.ue a group of Americans and Europeans and some Congolese, who were
threatened with death by a group of
Congolese rehds_ I n the pror.ess of
rescuing them, the army of the rebellion
was more or less destroyed, hut that was
purely incidental. Nevertheless, this
caused a tremendous uproar in Africa.
The Organization of African Unity
adopted a strong resolution against it,
and the Mrican states went to the United
Nations and got the Security Council to
adopt a resolution condemning this kind
of intervention, despite its humanitarian
character, and asked the Organization of
Mrican Unity to take such further action
as may be necessary.
So you have here the end of the old
rule and the beginning of the new: that
even in the most justifiable cases, there
should no longer 1)(' intervention by
individual states; that it is the purpose
of the Charter of the United Nations, of
the various proccdures developed under
tht' charter, to take collcctive action on
behalf of the world community and in
tht' name of mankind whenever it is
required; and that no state can intervene
by itself on the hasis of its own judgment. Perhaps this is a wish that goes
heyond the realities and that we have
gone too far in tryin~ to aholish the old

before the new is really firmly in place_
I suppose the best remedy for this
problem would be not to try to continue to operate und('r past rules but to
try to make the new conc('pts work
better and more quickly. To this ('nd we
should try to develop more efficient
means for the United Nations to do the
job that needs to be done in such cases
rather than try to hamper the work of
the United Nations in this area. Therefore, in this coming 25th year of the
United Nations, one of the topics that
might he hefore it is to make this area
of international protection of human
rights more effectivc through strength(,ning the power of the United Nations.
That is the power to effectively deal
with problems and in this way relieve
the states, especially the big powers, of
the very difficult task of deciding
whether to take action on their own and
to run into the kind of difficulty that
the United States ran into in the Dominican Republic or which faced the
joint action by the United States and
Belgium in the Congo_ So it is not really
taking an important privilege away from
the big powers, but it is a means for
relieving them of a hurden which they
should not have to shoulder and which
they have no desire to shoulder anymore. If we can find a more effective
means, f:O much the better for them and
for mankind.

FOOTNOTES
1. Grover Clark, "English Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons," American
Journal of International Law, October 1933, p. 694.
2. Colby 1\1. Chester, "Diplomacy of the Quarterdeck," American Journal of International
Law, July 1914, p. 445.
3. Charles O. Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press), p. 8-9.
4. Colby.
5. Ibid., p. 443, 445.
6. Richard B. Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights," Iowa Law
Review, October 1967, p. 325, 338-40.

----'¥----

